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 can complement the discourse to better understand under-
lying assumptions, beliefs, and values. Ultimately, this
will allow a more nuanced view on normative evaluations
of clinical scenarios.
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DISEMBODIED MINDS, INTELLIGENT BODIES
Mecacci and Haselager (2014) argue that human beings
tend to think of themselves as “disembodied minds.” We
are intuitive Cartesians, the authors contend, either
because we are culturally led to embracing body–mind
dualism, or because our cognitive system is so hard-wired
(the Cartesian mind–body dualism is discussed in Pardo
and Patterson [2013]).
We shall not argue against this conjecture, which has
been advanced by other scholars (Bloom 2004, cited in
Mecacci and Haselager 2014) and is indeed close to our
own intuition. One may, in fact, go even further, and
hypothesize that human beings are alarmed and destabi-
lized by the very fact of becoming aware of the sophisti-
cated, complex, and apparently fragile biological
mechanisms that make it possible for us to function
normally.
In the Confessions of Zeno, Italo Svevo thus describes the
psychological reaction of the young, healthy Zeno to a con-
versation with his friend Tullio, who walks with a limp:
Tullio and I began talking about his illness. . . . He told me in
amusement that when one is walking rapidly each step takes
no more than half a second, and in that half second no fewer
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than fifty-four muscles are set in motion. I listened in awe. I
once directed my attention to my legs and tried to discover
the infernal machine. . . . I could not of course distinguish all
its fifty-four parts, but I discovered something terrifically
complicated which seemed to get out of order the instant I
begun thinking about it. I limped as I left the cafe, and for sev-
eral days afterwards walking became a burden to me, even
causing a certain amount of pain. (Svevo 1958, 83)
The very surfacing to our consciousness of our corpo-
real mechanisms thus appears to have destabilizing poten-
tial. For example, reading medical information over the
Internet is known to trigger health fears, a phenomenon
known as cyberchondria (Aiken et al. 2012; White and
Horvitz 2009). The ability to organize and plan one’s time
and activities in accordance with one’s physical needs is
acquired relatively late in life, and it comes with experi-
ence, possibly because it is, to some extent, counterintui-
tive. In conclusion, we postulate that human beings have
the tendency to, and like to, think of themselves dualisti-
cally, as disembodied minds and intelligent bodies. We
take for granted our body’s ability to self-regulate and to
create the necessary conditions for the appropriate func-
tioning of our mental life, and we tend to function better if
we are not conscious of how exactly our body operates.
IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SUFFERING OF DBS
PATIENTS REALLY TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO A
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK SHIFT?
The authors argue that adverse psychological reactions to
DBS may be connected with the fact that the patient experi-
ences a shift from his or her (innate or culturally acquired)
Cartesian mind–brain conceptual framework, to a brain-
centric materialistic scheme that, according to Mecacci and
Haselager, may be psychologically unsettling.
This is an intellectually stimulating and thought-pro-
voking hypothesis, but we do not find ourselves in agree-
ment with it. We think it could be tested empirically,
through studies on pharmacologically treated psychiatic
patients (e.g., severely depressed patients), observing the
patients’ intuitive conception of the mind–brain relation-
ship and their psychological reaction to treatment with
medications. We would expect to find that pharmacologi-
cally treated patients interpret their suffering as purely
existential rather than biologically based, thus embracing
Cartesianism at an intuitive level. However, we would
also expect to find that when (and if) medications make
them feel better, patients tend to be happy and satisfied,
even though the fact may force them to abandon their Car-
tesian intuitive conceptual framework in favor of a brain-
centric materialistic scheme. There is probably no
relationship between the patient’s mind–brain intuitive
conceptual framework and his or her psychological adjust-
ment, or lack thereof, to medical treatment directly affect-
ing the functioning of the brain.
We think it rather likely that DBS tends to involve
more psychological maladjustment than pharmacological
treatment alone, but we would attribute that to the higher
invasiveness of DBS, which entails both traditional surgery
to implant electrodes in the brain and frequent electrical
stimulations directly to the brain. We postulate that the
more invasive the treatment, the more difficult it is for the
patient to adjust to it, physically and psychologically. We
further think this is to be attributed to the more radical
alteration of the extremely complex physiological balance
on which the human body rests, an equilibrium that
results from millions of years of evolution, and whose pro-
cesses and operation are known only partially by contem-
porary medicine and science.
This is not to deny that the patient’s discomfort may be
partially imputable to cultural factors as well; however,
rather than calling into question the conceptual framework
of the mind–brain relationship, we would formulate a dif-
ferent conjecture. Patients may be wary of direct physical
interventions on the brain, because of the recent history of
psychiatry. In the 1960s and 1970s, electroshock and direct
physical interventions on the brain (known as
“psychosurgery”) on institutionalized patients have been
exposed as systematic abuse on defenseless human beings,
as they were indeed often carried out in forms and man-
ners and contexts where they constituted torture (or, at
best, experimentation) rather than treatment (Shorter and
Healy 2007). Could this not have led to relatively wide-
spread negative preconceptions regarding the use of direct
electrical stimulation to the brain as a form of medical
treatment?
PHYSICIAN, HEAL THYSELF
Mecacci and Haselager argue that doctors tend to pass
along to DBS patients a braincentric, materialistic account
of the mind–brain relationship. This thought-provoking
hypothesis could be tested through qualitative studies
with doctors and patients, exploring the style and content
of their communication with patients and their metaphysi-
cal assumptions concerning the mind–brain relationship.
We do not believe we would find that doctors endorse
braincentric materialism; nor would we expect to find that
they pass such a view along to the patient. To our knowl-
edge, no such study has been carried out yet; however,
based on Moratti’s research experience in medical decision
making in various countries, we would expect most doc-
tors, at least certainly Dutch doctors (we mention this
because Mecacci and Haselager are affiliated with DCCN,
a Dutch institution), to be making active and constant
efforts to avoid coaching patients into a particular meta-
physical view (Moratti 2010a). If any such view is never-
theless passed along implicitly (Moratti 2010b), it is
probably close to Clark’s extended cognition approach:
Human intelligence is partially embedded in the external
world, and both constrained and supported by the ecologi-
cal and technological surrounding resources; technological
artifacts thus become a constitutive part of our selves
(Clark 2003, cited in Meccaci and Haselager). Meccaci and
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Haselager suggest Clark’s framework could be less desta-
bilizing to patients than braincentric materialism; how-
ever, we submit that it is a materialism, too, although not
braincentric.
We would like to make two more remarks in this
regard. Doctors are subject to the same cultural influences,
and endowed with the same cognitive apparatus, as any-
one else; if we all are intuitive Cartesians, why should doc-
tors be braincentric materialists? We can here make two
hypotheses. If the Cartesian framework is brought about
by Western culture, medical training drives deep-seated
Cartesian cultural influences out of doctors. If the Carte-
sian framework is hard-wired in the cognitive structure of
human beings, medical training modifies doctors’ cogni-
tive structure to a very profound level. The latter conten-
tion seems to us difficult to support, but we do agree that
education may change people’s intuitions; however, we
look forward to seeing more evidence and arguments to
support it.
We also submit that if the tendency to perceive oneself
as a “disembodied mind” is not culture-dependent, but
rather deeply entrenched in human cognitive mechanisms
(Bloom 2004, cited in Mecacci and Haselager), we do not
see how cultural changes (including a change in communi-
cation with doctors) could modify it.
OVERTURNING THE QUESTION
We believe the key issue here is not why patients react
adversely to an extremely invasive procedure. Indeed, it is
to be expected that patients could not possibly want and
therefore would not accept such a very disruptive interfer-
ence with one’s sense of self and ability to control one’s
mind. What needs to be clarified instead is how, when,
and why some patients eventually do adjust well to DBS
psychologically. It would be desirable, we believe, to carry
out studies on this group of patients alone, which, we
would be inclined to speculate, are a relatively rare excep-
tion among people who have undergone DBS. How inva-
lidating was their symptomatology before DBS, and how
did DBS impact on their quality of life? What type of con-
siderations did they make when deciding to undergo DBS,
and why exactly did the treatment meet their expectations?
Finally, a purely ethical consideration: Psychological
maladaptation, shown to be rather frequent by the
research cited in Mecacci and Haselager, should be
regarded as an expected, potential and serious side effect,
and weighted against potential treatment benefits. Under
which circumstances does it become morally acceptable
for doctors to suggest DBS? When can DBS be reasonably,
realistically expected to lead to an actual improvement to
the patients’ overall condition and quality of life?
Important ethical and societal challenges exist in the cur-
rent and extending practice of DBS (Bell, Mathieu, and
Racine 2009; Johansson et al. 2014). We would consider it
opportune to exercise great caution when offering highly
invasive treatment. The central ethical imperative guiding
the medical profession is primum non nocere (first, do not
do harm [to your patients]), and the patient’s right to phys-
ical and psychological integrity must always be taken very
seriously, no matter how severely compromised his or her
condition (Beauchamp and Childress 2008).
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